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EMPLOYEE STOCK OPTIONS: THE EFFECT UPON A
CORPORATION'S EARNINGS AND PROFITS
Harold S. Divine' and Luckman v. Commissioner2
In both Harold S. Divine' and Luckman v. Commissioner
the taxpayers received dividends from the Rapid American Cor-
poration and claimed that the distribution of cash which they had
received should not be taxed as dividends because the corporation
had no earnings and profits.
By defining a dividend as a distribution out of earnings and
profits, 5 the Internal Revenue Code6 creates the possibility of a
1. [1972 Transfer Binder] CCH TAX CT. REP. 3235 [CCH Dec. 31,582], 59 T.C.
No. 15 (Oct. 25, 1972), appeal granted, 2d Circuit, Civil Docket No. 73-1732.
2. 418 F.2d 381 (7th Cir. 1969), rev'g 50 T.C. 619 (1968), noted in 39 U. CIN. L. REV.
384 (1970).
3. [1972 Transfer Binder] CCH TAX CT. REP. 3235 [CCH Dec. 31,582], 59 T.C.
No. 15 (October 25, 1972).
4. 418 F.2d 381 (7th Cir. 1969).
5. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 316(a) provides, in part:
[Tihe term "dividend" means any distribution of property made by a corporation
to its shareholders-
(1) out of its earnings and profits accumulated after February 28, 1913, or
(2) out of its earnings and profits of the taxable year. ...
INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 301(c) provides, in part:
(1) Amount Constituting Dividend.-That portion of the distribution which is a
dividend (as defined in section 316) shall be included in gross income.
(2) Amount Applied Against Basis.-That portion of the distribution which is not
a dividend shall be applied against and reduce the adjusted basis of the stock.
(3) Amount In Excess of Basis.-
(A) In General.- . . [That portion of the distribution which is not a
dividend, to the extent that it exceeds the adjusted basis of the stock, shall
be treated as a gain from the sale or exchange of property.
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distribution to shareholders being taxed at other than the ordi-
nary income rates applied to dividends.7 If the taxpayer is suc-
cessful in arguing that the distribution exceeded earnings and
profits, the portion of the distribution in excess of earnings and
profits will be taxed as a return of capital (no tax) or at capital
gains rates,' either of which is more advantageous to the taxpayer
than taxation at ordinary income rates.
During the period January 1, 1957 through January 31, 1963
the Rapid American Corp. granted restricted stock options at a
price below market value to certain of its key employees. The
recipients' exercise of their options resulted in the purchase of
186,558 shares of authorized but unissued Rapid common stock.
Based upon the quoted market price at the date of exercise, the
aggregate market value of these shares was $5,671,120.00. Rapid,
of course, received only the option price of $2,044,748.00. The
difference between these two sums, the option spread at exercise,
if subtracted from Rapid's earnings and profits account, would
have exhausted it.' Subsequent to the exercise of the stock op-
tions Rapid paid cash dividends to the shareholders.
Luckman v. Commissioner was the first litigation to arise
concerning the tax status of these dividends. In Luckman the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the spread be-
tween the fair market value of the stock and the option price on
the date of purchase did reduce earnings and profits. Conse-
quently, the distribution received by Mr. Luckman was not a
dividend. °
The Commissioner, undaunted by the Luckman result, reli-
tigated the issue in Harold S. Divine." Mr. Divine was a Rapid
shareholder who had received a portion of the cash dividends paid
by Rapid after exercise of the stock options. The Divine case
concerned the same facts as Luckman, except for the amounts
distributed to each taxpayer and the taxable years involved. In
Divine the taxpayer argued that the difference between the fair
If the distribution exceeds the adjusted basis, under section 301(c)(3), the excess will be
a capital gain if the stock qualifies as a capital asset under INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 1221.
6. Unless otherwise indicated, all references are to the IrT. REV. CODE of 1954.
7. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 61(a)(7).
8. See note 5 supra.
9. Luckman v. Commissioner, 418 F.2d 381, 383 (7th Cir. 1969).
10. See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
11. The first issue before the Tax Court was whether the Commissioner was collater-
ally estopped by the Luckman decision. The court resolved the estoppel issue in favor of
the Commissioner and proceeded to a decision on the merits. The estoppel issue will not
be treated in this note.
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market value of the stock and the lower option price actually paid
by the employees was a compensation expense that reduced the
corporation's earnings and profits. The Tax Court rejected this
line of analysis, finding that there was no reduction of earnings
and profits, and characterized the distribution to Divine as a
dividend.
Rapid did not claim the aggregate difference between the
market price of the stock at exercise and the option price (option
spread at exercise) as a deduction on its federal income tax re-
turns"2 nor did it reduce its balance sheet retained earnings ac-
count by that amount.' 3 It did advise the taxpayer in Divine not
to report any of the distributions to him as dividend income on
his federal income tax returns for the years 1961 and 1962, and
the taxpayer followed this advice.
At the threshold, the issue was the effect, if any, of the option
spread at exercise upon the corporation's earnings and profits. If,
as the taxpayer argued, the option spread at exercise does reduce
earnings and profits, then the distribution by Rapid was not a
dividend because its earnings and profits account was exhausted
by the spread at exercise.
The Tax Court in Divine agreed with the Commissioner" and
held that the option spread at exercise did not affect Rapid's
earnings and profits. Essential to the Divine rationale was the
assumption that the income tax treatment of an item predicates
that item's earnings and profits effect. 5 Because restricted stock
options provided no income tax deduction to the corporation,'"
the court reasoned, no earnings and profits reduction would be
allowed. Thus, the distribution to the taxpayer was a dividend.
By implication, non-statutory stock option plans which do pro-
vide an income tax deduction to the corporation 7 would reduce
12. Rapid could have deducted neither the option spread at grant nor the option
spread at exercise. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 424(a), 421(a)(2).
13. The accounting treatment is not dispositive of the earnings and profits treat-
ment. B. BrrrKFE & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHARE-
HOLDERS (3d. student ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as B. BITTKER & J. Eusra], 7.03 at
7-13; Treas. Reg. § 1.312-6 (1955).
14. The Tax Court in Divine reached the same result it had reached earlier in
Luckman. The two cases were similarly disposed of, but on different rationales. In
Luckman, the rationale was that the corporation suffered no loss because it received good
will from the employee equal to the option spread at exercise.
15. Taxable income is normally the point of departure in computing earnings and
profits, but the latter account need not and often does not follow the former. B. BrrrKER
& J. EUSTICE, 7.03, at 7-13. See note 22 infra and accompanying text.
16. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 424(a), 421(a)(2).




In dictum the court stated that if a restricted stock option
plan were to have an effect upon the corporation's earnings and
profits, that effect would be measured by the option spread at
grant.'8 Under this view, Rapid would have retained sufficient
earnings and profits to make the distribution to the taxpayer a
dividend.
The Divine decision directly conflicts with the result in
Luckman which reduced the corporation's earnings and profits by
the option spread at exercise. The Luckman court found that the
spread was essentially compensation and, since compensation is
an expense, should reduce earnings and profits.'9 Additionally,
the court argued, this compensation expense should reduce earn-
ings and profits because in economic reality the corporation could
have paid the employee a cash sum equal to the spread at exercise
which the employee could have used to purchase the stock. Be-
cause a cash payment would reduce earnings and profits, the
court reasoned that a stock option should also reduce that ac-
count since the practical effect of both transactions would be the
same: the corporation would receive services and the employee
would receive stock.20
EARNINGS AND PROFITS
The meaning of earnings and profits has been the subject of
an on-going debate' ever since these words were introduced to the
18. This alternate measuring point was suggested in Jacoby, Earnings and Profits:
A Not so Theoretical Concept-Some Winds of Change, N.Y.U. 29TH INST. ON FED. TAX.
649, 665 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Jacoby]. The option spread at grant will always be
a lesser sum that the option spread at exercise if the market has risen since the grant. In
fact, under this alternate Divine view, Rapid would have retained sufficient earnings and
profits to render the distribution to the taxpayer a dividend.
With the advent of the qualified stock option in 1964 (see note 85 infra) the existence
of a spread at grant, tolerated under the restricted stock option, was made impossible.
INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 422(b)(4).
19. True expenses reduce earnings and profits. B. BrrnEKR & J. EUSTcE 7.03, at 7-
18, 7-19.
20. This analogy has been criticized for ignoring the form of the transaction, for
understating realized gains by the corporation, and for assuming an improbable bar-
gain-that the corporation would agree to pay a cash sum determined by fortuitous mar-
ket factors. Jacoby, supra note 18, at 664-65. See notes 99 et seq. infra and accompanying
text.
21. Paul, Ascertainment of "Earnings & Profits" for the Purpose of Determining
Taxability of Corporate Distributions, 51 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1937); Rudick, "Dividends"
and "Earnings or Profits" Under the Income Tax Law: Corporate Non-Liquidation
Distributions, 89 U. PA. L. REV. 865 (1941); Andrews, "Out of its Earnings and Profits":
Some Reflections on the Taxation of Dividends, 69 HARV. L. REv. 1403 (1956); Katcher,
1973]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
federal income tax law in 1916.2 The first income taxing act, the
Revenue Act of 1913, taxed dividends 23 but did not define the
term. In Lynch v. Hornby24 the Supreme Court interpreted divi-
dend to include all dividends paid in the ordinary course of busi-
ness, notwithstanding their source. To prevent the taxation of
earnings that accrued prior to enactment of the Revenue Act of
1913 the Revenue Act of 1916 introduced the term earnings and
profits.25 It provided that:
the term "dividends" as used in this title shall be held to
mean any distribution made or ordered to be made by a
corporation . . . out of its earnings or profits accrued since
March first, nineteen hundred and thirteen. .... 21
From the first instance the Code provided no definition for
earnings and profits from which its application to specific situa-
tions could be reasoned deductively. In their search for a defini-
tion the courts apparently accepted the premise that Congress
intended to tax the corporation and the shareholder as two sepa-
rate entities. 2 The corporation was to be taxed on its earnings and
profits, and the shareholder was to be taxed on distributions paid
by the corporation on his investment, regardless of the funds used
to pay the distribution or the date of purchase of the stock. Under
this separate entity concept, income exempt from tax to the cor-
poration, such as municipal bond interest, when distributed to
the shareholder loses its character and is dividend income. 2 A
slightly more anomalous result occurs when the shareholder re-
ceives a distribution immediately after purchasing a share of
stock. Rather than being a return of capital, the distribution is
taxable as a dividend to the shareholder to the extent the corpora-
What is Meant by Earnings and Profits, N.Y.U. 18TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 235 (1960);
Jacoby, supra note 18.
22. The Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 2, 39 Stat. 757.
23. The Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, § 2(A)(2) 38 Stat. 114, 166-67.
24. 247 U.S. 339 (1918).
25. See B. BrrrKER & J. EUSTICE 7.03 at 7-11.
26. The Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 2, 39 Stat. 757.
27. United States v. Phellis, 257 U.S. 156 (1921). This proposition is intrinsic in all
cases applying the requirement of earnings and profits where the character of a distribu-
tion as a dividend was at issue. The only recognized exception to the separate entity rule
is the Code's treatment of taxable stock dividends. See note 63 infra and accompanying
text.
28. Charles F. Ayer, 12 B.T.A. 284, 287 (1928) contains the first judicial utterance
on this point. See Treas. Reg. § 1.32-6(b) (1955). That municipal bonds lose their charac-
ter as tax exempt income upon distribution is a well settled and long established proposi-
tion. 1 MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 9.32 (Malone ed. 1969).
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tion has earnings" in excess of contributed capital.31
Using the separate entity concept as an operating premise for
their focus on the corporation the courts have wielded the defini-
tion of earnings and profits on a case by case basis with only an
occasional statutory reaction.3 ' The Internal Revenue Code fails
to provide a definition. Most probably the content of earnings and
profits eluded the Congress responsible for its introduction to the
income tax law. The decisions seem to accept earnings and profits
as the measurable amount of realized gain in excess of contrib-
uted capital which remains for distribution to the shareholders. 31
Under this approach the earnings and profits treatment of an
item usually 33 follows the income tax treatment since most in-
come and expense items taken into account for taxable income
will affect the amount of realized gain available to be distrib-
uted.34 It is for this reason that the computation of earnings and
profits begins with taxable income.35
29. United States v. Phellis, 257 U.S. 156 (1921).
30. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 301(c) provides that a dividend is a distribution out
of earnings and profits. Loosely speaking, earnings and profits measures the productivity
of the capital contributed to the corporation. If the contributed capital has produced no
gains in any year, any distribution to the shareholder will not be a dividend. When
contributed capital is returned to the shareholders, the treatment accorded the share-
holder is specified in INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 301(c). See note 5 supra.
31. Commissioner v. Young Corp., 103 F.2d 137 (3d Cir. 1939) (gain resulting from
a tax free exchange enters into earnings and profits) was abandoned by Int. Rev. Code of
1939, ch. 1, § 115(1), as amended, 54 Stat. 1004 (1940) [codified without substantial
change in INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 312(f)(1)] which required that earnings and profits
not be augmented until the gain was recognized.
Dorothy Whitney Elmhirst, 41 B.T.A. 348 (1940) (wash sale losses reduce earnings
and profits). This rule was changed by the Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 610, § 146, 56 Stat.
841 Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 115(1), (now INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 312(f)(1)) which
provided that no adjustment be made to earnings and profits for wash sale losses that were
not allowed as an income tax deduction under Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 118, 56 Stat.
(now INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 1091). No adjustment to earnings and profits is necessary
since the loss is handled through adjustment of the corporation's basis in the stock. Ir.
REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1091(d).
32. Jacoby, supra note 18, at 652.
33. See Henry C. Beck Co., 52 T.C. 1, aff'd per curiam, 433 F.2d 309 (5th Cir. 1970)
which involved gain on intercompany transactions not recognized under 1955 rules for
consolidated returns. The court held that the gain increased earnings and profits and
stated:
[Earnings and profits] are not synonomous with taxable income. . . . Frequently,
items of unallowable losses will decrease earnings and profits, or items nontaxable
income will increase earnings and profits. . . . Many items are includable in earn-
ings and profits which are not taxable income. . . . It is clear, therefore, that
"earnings and profits" is much broader than "taxable income."
52 T.C. at 6. See B. BrrrKFa & J. EUSTIcE 7.03.
34. See Commissioner v. Gross, 236 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1956).
35. B. Brt-rKER & J. EUSTICE 7.03, at 7-13.
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To compute earnings and profits, taxable income is adjusted
for those transactions which were not included in computing tax-
able income and also for transactions which, while included in
computing taxable income, had no effect upon the corporate as-
sets.
Transactions of the first category, those not taken into tax-
able income, may increase or decrease earnings and profits. Earn-
ings and profits are increased by items such as municipal bond
interest"6 and life insurance proceeds 37 which increased the assets
of the corporation, but which were not included as receipts in the
computation of taxable income. Conversely, items such as excess
charitable deductions 38 and lobbying expenses 3 are subtracted
from earnings and profits. These items, while not reflected in
taxable income, were actually paid and served to reduce the cor-
porate assets.'"
In the second category, transactions which are taken into
taxable income but which do not reduce earnings and profits, are
items such as net operating loss carry forwards4 and dividend
received exclusions.42 These items, while providing an income tax
deduction, do not reduce the corporate assets in the year of de-
duction and are therefore added back to taxable income in com-
puting earnings and profits. A transaction very similar in charac-
ter because it does not represent an actual reduction of corporate
assets is the stock dividend. A stock dividend is a paper transfer4 3
from retained earnings to the capital account which does not
reduce either taxable income or earnings and profits," but does
36. Id. at 7-14.
37. See Cummings v. Commissioner, 73 F.2d 477 (lst Cir. 1934). The current Code
exemption for life insurance proceeds is specified in INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 101(a).
38. Jacob M. Kaplan, 43 T.C. 580 (1965).
39. See Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498 (1959). In 1962 a limited deduc-
tion for lobbying expenses was added, INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 162(e).
40. B. BrrrKER & J. EUSTICE 7.03, at 7-18.
41. Id. at 7-17. Net operating losses may be carried forward under INT. REV. CODE
of 1954, § 172. Such losses do reduce earnings and profits in the year incurred.
42. Dividends received from another corporation are received in full and the 85%
dividends received deduction under INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 243 for taxable income is
artificial. See Rudick, "Dividends" and "Earnings or Profits" Under the Income Tax Law:
Corporate Non-Liquidating Distributions, 89 U. PA. L. REV. 865, 885-86 (1941).
43. Commissioner v. Fender Sales, Inc., 338 F.2d 924, 927 (9th Cir. 1964).
44. See Eisner v. MaComber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920) (paper transfer). Although a stock
dividend reduces the retained earnings account of a corporation the dividend itself is paid
in additional shares of stock rather than out of the realized earnings of the corporation.
For this reason, non-reduction of earnings and profits is the theoretically proper treat-
ment, Walker v. Hopkins, 12 F.2d 262 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 271 U.S. 687 (1926). The
current Code provides for a reduction of earnings and profits by the amount of a taxable
[VOL. XXXIII
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reduce the corporation's retained earnings account on its finan-
cial statements.45 From this discussion it can be seen that earn-
ings and profits necessarily does not follow taxable income" or the
accounting concept of retained earnings.
In defining earnings and profits the courts have focused on
the corporation's potential for distributing realized gains47 to its
shareholders." The realization requirement causes the earnings
and profits effect of a transaction on the corporation to be differ-
ent from the income tax effect of that transaction upon the share-
holder. Illustratively, if the corporation pays a dividend in prop-
erty so that it does not recognize any gain or loss on the distribu-
tion48 ' and the property so distributed has a basis below its fair
market value, the corporation would reduce earnings and profits
by the basis and the shareholder would take into income the fair
market value of the property." This is proper because the basis
represents the realized cost to the corporation. To subtract the
fair market value would be to subtract gain that had never been
included in earnings and profits and consequently to understate
the account.
stock dividend [INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 312(d)] but this reduction follows from equita-
ble rather than theoretical considerations. See note 68 infra and accompanying text.
45. P. GRADY, ACCOUNTING RESEARCH STUDY No. 7, INVENTORY OF GENERALLY Ac-
CEPTED ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES FOR BUSINESS ENTERPRISES 206-07 (1965).
46. See notes 13, 15 supra.
47. See note 32 supra and accompanying text. This is best illustrated by the treat-
ment accorded a distribution by the corporation to the shareholder of appreciated prop-
erty. By reason of INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 311(a)(2) the transaction is not deemed to
be a sale by the corporation and no gain or loss is recognized. Therefore, INT. REV. CODE
OF 1954, § 312(a)(3) reduces the corporation's earnings and profits by the adjusted basis
of the asset. If earnings and profits were reduced by the market value there would be a
subtraction of gain that had never been included in earnings and profits. Such a treatment
would understate those earnings and profits available for distribution to the shareholders.
Harold S. Divine, 59 T.C. No. 15 (1972) (Raum, J. concurring). See B. BIrrKER & J.
EUSTICE 7.03 at 7-13: "[Ilt is quite clear that appreciation or depreciation in value that
has not been 'realized' in the income tax sense does not affect earnings and profits."
Although current earnings and profits theory requires realization and recognition, the
validity of this requirement has been seriously questioned. See Jacoby, supra note 28.
Other commentators have thought that the whole concept of earnings and profits should
be abandoned. Andrews, "Out of its Earnings and Profits": Some Reflections on the
Taxation of Dividends, 69 HARv. L. REV. 1403 (1956).
It is not within the intended scope of this note to analyze the requirement of realiza-
tion in earnings and profits theory or to deal with the abolition of the concept entirely.
Accordingly, this note sets forth an analysis of the effect of stock options upon earnings
and profits within the context of current judicial resolutions that realization is required
before earnings and profits can be affected.
48. Henry C. Beck Co., 52 T.C. 1, 6 aff'd per curiam, 433 F.2d 309 (5th Cir. 1970).
48.1. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 311.
49. Timberlake v. Commissioner, 132 F.2d 259 (4th Cir. 1942); Treas. Reg. § 1.312-
1(c) (ex. 1) (1955).
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As with most rules of law, the realization requirement can
claim several exceptions to its general operation. In some transac-
tions the realization requirement is temporarily ignored and the
earnings and profits treatment of an item will closely track that
item's income tax treatment. For administrative convenience,
this course is followed in those transactions where there is an
ultimate tax effect that will correctly state earnings and profits
in accord with the realization requirement at some future date.
Because mechanical rules generally create this ultimate accord,
this exception will be termed the mechanical exception.
Bangor & Aroostook Railroad Co. 0 nicely illustrates the me-
chanical exception. In that case the taxpayer corporation received
income from the discharge of indebtedness and elected to ex-
empt5 the gain from that year's income. Mechanically, that elec-
tion required the corporation to reduce the basis of its assets.
Reducing the basis of the corporation's assets had two effects. It
reduced subsequent depreciation charges and, upon disposition,
would also serve to increase the gain taken into taxable income,
or decrease the loss, if the assets were not fully depreciated at the
time of disposition. The court held that earnings and profits
would follow the tax treatment and be augmented in the latter
years by the effect of the reduced basis. This result seems proper
because otherwise the earnings and profits account would be in-
creased twice by the same gain-first, at the time of the dis-
charge of indebtedness and second, by the effect of the reduced
basis.5"
Section 312(m) of the Internal Revenue Code 3 illustrates the
application of the mechanical exception to unrealized losses.
Under that section an asset must be depreciated on the straight
line method and the depreciation deduction reduces earnings and
profits. Illustratively, if an asset has a cost of $100 and a useful
life of ten years, this section requires a reduction of earnings and
profits by $10 each year.54 Thus, if after five years the asset is sold
for $50 the reduction of earnings and profits by $50 will then be
50. 16 T.C. 578, a/i'd, 193 F.2d 827 (1st Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 934 (1952).
51. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 22(b)(9) (codified without substantial change in
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 108).
52. Of course, if the corporation elected to take the gain from the discharge of
indebtedness into income, earnings and profits would be augmented at that time. INT.
REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 108, 1017.
53. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 312(m).
54. For purposes of this example, the use of salvage value has been omitted. Salvage
value is explained in INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 167(f) and its application to INT. REV. CODE
OF 1954, § 312(m) is discussed in Jacoby, supra note 18, at 680-81.
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realized and no further reduction is made. This tax effect demon-
strates that the depreciation charge, although unrealized, is
brought into accord with the realization requirement when the
asset is disposed of. This treatment of unrealized losses represents
the converse of Bangor & Aroostook, yet like Bangor & Aroostook
insures that the earnings and profits account will not be twice
affected by the same item of gain or loss.
For policy reasons, another exception to the realization re-
quirement has recently developed for expenditures that have
been disallowed as a deduction in computing taxable income.
Although this policy exception is of unsettled status, it is impor-
tant because its application contravenes the separate entity
theory of earnings and profits.54 '
In Davis v. United States55 the defendant was criminally pro-
secuted for tax evasion, being charged with unreported taxable
income as a result of diverting checks payable to the corporation
to his own use. He defended on the theory that for the government
to prevail, the monies he diverted must have been income. The
defendant argued that as a shareholder of the corporation the
money he received was a dividend rather than income. Thus, he
concluded, the government must prove the existence of earnings
and profits. The court rejected this argument and would not re-
duce earnings and profits although it was not clear if they consid-
ered the sums diverted by the defendant to be dividends.
Although Davis makes for unclear reading, the general prop-
osition advanced by the case is that in criminal prosecutions the
corporation and the shareholders will be treated as a single en-
tity."6 Originally the court that decided Davis held that the single
entity rationale would be limited to criminal prosecutions,5" but
in a subsequent decision,5" the same court indicated that the
Davis rationale was applicable in civil litigation. If applied in
civil litigation the Davis theory would be combined with the code
sections which provide that no deduction shall be allowed for
illegal bribes of government employees,59 fines and penalties paid
to any government,0 and treble damage penalties for violations
of the anti-trust laws.'
54.1. See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
55. 226 F.2d 331 (6th Cir. 1955).
56. Id. at 335.
57. Drybrough v. Commissioner, 238 F.2d 735 (6th Cir. 1956).
58. Weir v. Commissioner, 283 F.2d 675 (6th Cir. 1960).
59. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 162(c).
60. Id. § 162(f).
61. Id. § 162(g).
19731
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Juxtaposed, the codified disallowed business deductions and
the single entity theory of Davis provide the basis for a court to
pierce the separate entity theory and impute the behavior of the
corporation to its shareholders. Although Davis and its progeny
all involved closely-held corporations, the thrust of the juxtaposi-
tion does not require that the application of the single entity
theory be so limited. If the behavior of a corporation is imputed
to its shareholders so that there is no reduction of earnings and
profits, a distribution to them might be taxed as dividend in-
come when in fact it was a return of capital. Aside from reliance
on the merger concept of Davis in the event of wrongdoing, such
a result could be justified under the theory that a reduction in
earnings and profits would be a benefit to the shareholders. For
anyone to benefit from the expenditure would be violative of the
social policy against that type of expenditure; therefore, the ex-
penditure should not reduce earnings and profits.
Another type of policy exception can be found in the earnings
and profits treatment of taxable stock dividends. Following the
decision in Eisner v. Macomber,"2 which held that stock dividends
did not result in income that could be constitutionally taxed,
courts held that earnings and profits were not reduced by a stock
dividend on the theory that the transaction involved a paper
transfer which did not reduce the corporate assets available for
distribution. 3 With the erosion of the Macomber constitutional
doctrine, 4 stock dividends became taxable even though no corpo-
rate assets were paid out. The Code65 provides that if any share-
holder had an election to take property (including cash) rather
than stock the stock dividend will be taxable. The recipient will
take into income the fair market value of the stock distributed
and that amount will reduce the corporation's earnings and prof-
its.6
Indefensible in theory-as no amount is actually taken out
of the corporate assets 6 -the earnings and profits treatment of
taxable stock dividends must be supported by a policy considera-
tion if it is to be supported at all. One policy to support the
62. 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
63. E.g., Walker v. Hopkins, 12 F.2d 262 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 271 U.S. 687 (1926).
64. See B. BrITKER & J. EUSTICE § 7.60, at 7-61.
65. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 305(b)(1).
66. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 312(d). Treas. Reg. § 1.312-1(d) (1955). See Treas.
Reg. § 1.305-2(c) (1969).
67. See Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920). SENATE FINANCE COMM., REPORT
OF TAX REFORM ACT OF 1969, S. REP. No. 91-552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 150 (1969).
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treatment of taxable stock dividends springs from equitable con-
siderations. Because the recipient has paid a tax on the receipt
of a piece of paper, the stock dividend, which represents amounts
still within the corporate assets, earnings and profits must be
reduced to avoid taxing the same recipient a second time upon
the earnings when they are actually distributed."
This equitable argument, however, rests upon a tenuous
proposition. In a public issue corporation shares are rapidly
traded and, thus, the recipient at the time of the stock dividend
may not be the one who receives the actual proceeds from the
asset distribution. 9
Another argument, similar to that made in Luckman, can be
made to support the earnings and profits treatment of taxable
stock dividends when the choice of cash or stock makes the distri-
bution taxable. This argument asserts that in net effect the vehi-
cle of income is the same." If the recipient of the stock desired,
he could have received cash and used it to purchase shares of the
corporation. Therefore, this argument concludes, since a cash
payment would reduce earnings and profits, so also should a stock
dividend when the cash or stock choice is offered.
This argument may be criticized on the ground that it
equates two forms of payment based upon their economic effect
on the shareholder. It does not address itself to the issue of why
the earnings and profits effect of a taxable stock dividend should
differ from a nontaxable stock dividend and therefore cannot sup-
port a discriminatory earnings and profits approach. Conse-
quently, the distinction between taxable and nontaxable stock
dividends for earnings and profits purposes seems most aptly
classified as an anomaly in earnings and profits theory unless
one accepts the equitable justification.
The discussion thus far has attempted to point out the in-
complete analysis inherent in the Divine court's resolution of nec-
essarily similar treatment of an item for the corporation's income
tax and earnings and profits computations. Rather than be
blindly guided by income tax treatment, the line of analysis must
look to the real effect of the transaction on the corporate assets.
68. This policy argument is made in Jacoby, supra note 18, at 667.
69. See United States v. Phellis, 257 U.S. 156 (1921).
70. SENATE FINANCE COMM., REPORT ON TAX REFORM ACT OF 1969, S. REP. No. 91-
552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 150 (1969).
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THE NATURE OF STOCK OPTIONS
An examination of the stock option begins with the recogni-
tion that stock options present considerations for income tax
treatment to the employee that do not resolve the problems pre-
sented for earnings and profits purposes. For income tax analysis,
the central problem is the character of a stock option composed
of compensation and capital contribution elements.7 Prior to two
clarifying decisions, one by the Congress" and the other by the
Supreme Court,73 courts struggled to classify the option as either
totally compensatory or totally a contribution to capital.
Delbert B. Geeseman,7" a 1938 Board of Tax Appeals deci-
sion, began the quandry for the courts by holding that a stock
option was a capital transaction. Subsequent decisions75 distin-
guished Geeseman, and, later, were themselves distinguished.
Important factors in the decisions included the characterization
of the option by the approving board resolution and the exist-
ence of an option spread at grant.7 Generally, if a resolution
existed proclaiming the option compensatory or if there were an
option spread at grant, the court would classify the entire trans-
action as compensatory. 8 Alternatively, the absence of either the
resolution or the spread could lead a court to classify the transac-
71. See Horwich, A Tale of Two Dicta: The Non-Restricted Stock Option, 18 U.
MIAMI L. REP. 596 (1964), AND Comment, Taxation of the Stock Option as Compensation,
9 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 703 (1962).
72. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 130A, 64 Stat. 942 (1950) (forerunner of INT. REV.
CODE OF 1954, § 421-424).
73. Commissioner v. La Bue, 351 U.S. 243 (1956).
74. 38 B.T.A. 258 (1938).
75. The cases between Geeseman and LoBue which held stock options to be compen-
satory were as follows: Albert Russel Erskine, 26 B.T.A. 147 (1932), Connolly's Estate v.
Commissioner, 135 F.2d 64 (6th Cir. 1943); Commissioner v. Smith, 324 U.S. 177 (1945);
Van Dusen v. Commissioner, 166 F.2d 647 (9th Cir. 1948); McNamara v. Commissioner,
210 F.2d 505 (7th Cir. 1954).
The second line of cases, holding the stock options to be a capital transaction, were
as follows: Denver Co. v. Commissioner, 75 F.2d 38 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 295 U.S. 763
(1935); Omaha Nat. Bank v. Commissioner, 75 F.2d 434 (8th Cir. 1935); Bothwell v.
Commissioner, 77 F.2d 35 (10th Cir. 1935); Merhengood Corp. v. Helvering, 89 F.2d 972
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 714 (1937); Rossheim v. Commissioner, 92 F.2d 247 (3d
Cir. 1937); Gordon M. Evans, 38 B.T.A. 1406 (1938); Charles E. Adams, 39 B.T.A. 387
(1939); Herbert H. Springford, 41 B.T.A. 1001 (1940).
As the years of decision indicate, the trend moved toward finding the transaction to
be compensatory.
76. E.g., McNamara v. Commissioner, 210 F.2d 505 (7th Cir. 1954).
77. E.g., Commissioner v. Smith, 324 U.S. 177 (1945).
78. Commissioner v. Smith, 324 U.S. 177 (1945) (option spread at grant); McNa-
mara v. Commissioner, 210 F.2d 505 (7th Cir. 1954) (board resolution); Connolly's Estate
v. Commissioner, 135 F.2d 64 (6th Cir. 1933) (board resolution).
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In Note, Employee Stock options: The Effect Upon a
Corporation's Earnings and Profits, 33 MD. L. REV. 190 (1973), the
second paragraph of footnote 85 should be the first paragraph
of footnote 86. Thereafter, add one number to each succeeding
footnote through the present footnote 98. Thereafter, all footnotes
correspond to the text except that footnote 108.1 should be
deleted.
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tion as a capital contribution." Unfortunately for the taxpayer,
the decisions finding the transaction compensatory preponder-
ated, and culminated in Commissioner v. Smith" which clearly
implied that all stock options were compensatory."1
Essentially in response to the Smith decision,82 Congress
made a policy decision that employees should receive preferred
tax treatment for some stock option plans, and, in 1950 enacted
the bill that eventually was codified as section 130A of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code of 1939.83 This section, which essentially codi-
fied84 the Geeseman decisional line, introduced the restricted
stock option. Those stock options which met the section 130A
requirements were to be treated as capital transactions. An em-
ployee receiving such an option would not be taxed until he dis-
posed of the stock, and, thus would be treated as if he had pur-
chased and sold the shares in the open market. The employer
participating in the restricted stock option transaction would not
be allowed a deduction at any point in time. This section 130A
resolution of the income tax effect of a statutory stock option was
carried forward under the current Code.
The current qualified stock option, 8 which replaced the re-
79. Rossheim v. Commissioner, 92 F.2d 247 (3d Cir. 1937) (option price substantially
equal to market price at time of grant); Gardner-Denver Co. v. Commissioner, 75 F.2d 38
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 295 U.S. 763 (1935) (option price equal to market price at time of
grant).
80. 324 U.S. 177 (1945).
81. See Horwich, A Tale of Two Dicta: The Non-Restricted Stock Option, 18 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 596 (1964).
82. S. REP. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 59-60 (1950).
83. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 130A, 64 Stat. 942 (1950). See note 85 infra.
84. E.g. Gardner-Denver Co. v. Commissioner, 75 F.2d 38 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
295 U.S. 763 (1935). See Note, 39 U. CIN. L. REV. 384 (1970).
85. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 422(b) sets out the qualified stock ption which, in
1964, replaced the restricted stock option. Under the qualified stock option, the option
plan must meet certain requirements, among which are the following: the option is
granted according to a plan which includes the aggregate number of shares which may be
issued under the option; the shareholders of the corporation approve the plan; the option
is not exercisable after the expiration of five years from the date of grant; and, generally,
the option price at the date of grant is not less than the fair market value of the stock.
For the exception to this last requirement, see note 87 infra.
The restricted stock option [Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 130A, 64 Stat. 942
(1950)A was carried forward without substantial change in INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 424
but is only applicable to options granted prior to January 1, 1964. For the taxable years
under discussion in Divine, and Luckman the restricted stock option provisions were
codified in INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 424. Differing from the qualified stock option, the
restricted stock option did not have to be granted at a price equal to then market value
of the shares of the corporation. Moreover, the recipient of a restricted stock option could
own 10% of the combined voting power of all the corporation's classes of stock and the
option could be exercised up to ten years following the grant. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
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stricted stock option in 1964, differs from the restricted stock
option in one important respect. The restricted stock option per-
mitted the option price to be below the market price of the stock
at the time the option was granted." The qualified stock option
generally requires that the option price be equal to the market
value of the stock at the date of grant. s7 Although the taxpayers
in Divine and Luckman had been recipients of restricted stock
options, the analysis of the earnings and profits question in these
cases is equally applicable to current qualified stock options. For
this reason, unless the context otherwise requires, option plans
§ 424(b). By comparison, the qualified stock option could not be granted to one owning
stock possessing more than 5% of the total combined voting power or value of all classes
of stock. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 422(b)(7).
86. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 422(b)(4). An exception to this requirement is provided
in § 422(c). Under this exception, if the corporation made a good-faith attempt to set the
option price at the market price which failed, the option remains qualified. In the year of
the option's exercise, however, the employee will take into gross income an amount equal
to the lesser of:
(A) 150 percent of the difference between the option price and the fair market
value of the share at the time the option was granted, or
(B) the difference between the option price and the fair market value of the share
at the timeof such exercise.
INT. REV. CODE OF 1054, § 422(c). The taxpayer's basis will be increased by the amount
includible under this exception in his gross income. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 422(c)(A)-
(B).
87. The INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 does not specify the tax treatment accorded the
recipient of a non-statutory stock option. A non-statutory stock option is defined as one
which fails to meet the statutory requirements of a statutory stock option plan, Treas. Reg.
§ 1.421-6 (1956).
The tax treatment accorded the recipient of the non-statutory stock option depends
upon when the fair market value of the option is ascertainable. If the option has a readily
ascertainable fair market value, it is taxed when granted and the employee receives
ordinary compensation income at that time. The existence of an option spread at the date
of grant does not demonstrate the existence of a readily ascertainable fair market value.
Commissioner v. Smith, 324 U.S. 177 (1945). Treas. Reg. § 1.421-6(a)(3) (1961) requires
that the option be actively traded or freely transferable in order to have an ascertainable
fair market value.
Ordinarily, if the option lacks a readily ascertainable fair market value, Treas. Reg.
§ 1.421-6(d)(1) (1961) holds that the spread between the option price and the market
value of the stock at the exercise of the option is compensation income to the employee
in the year of the option's exercise.
The final possibility for income tax treatment of the recipient of a non-statutory stock
option is obtained by juxtaposing INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 83 and Treas. Reg. § 1.421-
6(d)(1) (1961). If the option lacks a readily ascertainable fair market value and the stock
that would be purchased by the exercise of the option is not freely transferrable or would
be held under a substantial risk of forfeiture, then the employee has a choice. He may
choose to include upon exercise of the option the excess of the fair market value over the
option price as ordinary income in the year of exercise. Alternatively, he may choose to
include in income the excess of the fair market value of the stock over the option price in




will be designated as statutory (qualifying under the 1939 or 1954
Code) or nonstatutory.81
The stock options which failed to meet the statutory require-
ments for a restricted stock option were governed by the case law
prior to 1950. Under that case law, the compensatory stock option
created an employer deduction equal to the amount of compensa-
tion the employee took into income in the year of compensation.
For compensatory stock options, the major issue was when the
compensation was received. Some courts held that the compensa-
tion occured on the date the option was granted. 9 Other courts
held that the date the option was exercised was the date at which
compensation occured10 Because the employee receiving compen-
sation would be treated as a purchaser on the open market after
he had taken the compensation into income, it was to the em-
ployee's tax advantage to have the compensation occur at the
date of grant. This treatment would be favorable because, assum-
ing the stock to be a capital asset to the employee, the apprecia-
tion in value between the grant and exercise date would be capital
gain rather than ordinary compensation.
Thus, in 1950 two pressing issues were unresolved: first, were
some non-statutory stock options still treatable as a capital in-
vestment; and second, if all non-statutory stock options were
compensatory to the employee, when did the compensation
occur.
9 1
Commissioner v. LoBue,92 a 1956 Supreme Court decision,
generally resolved these two pressing issues. LoBue involved a
stock option transaction, completed prior to the enactment of
section 130A, that gave the employee the privilege of purchasing
a stated number of shares of the employer corporation at a set
price over a three year period. Although it was not explicit in the
majority opinion,9" the LoBue Court implied that the stock option
price was below the fair market value of the stock at the date of
the grant. The Court held the option compensatory and stated
that "[w]hen assets are transferred by an employer to an em-
ployee to secure better services they are plainly compensation."94
88. E.g., McNamara v. Commissioner, 210 F.2d 505 (7th Cir. 1954).
89. E.g., Van Dusen v. Commissioner, 166 F.2d 647 (9th Cir. 1948).
90. For the various possible dates at which the compensation may be measured see
notes 88 supra and 96 infra.
91. 351 U.S. 243 (1956).
92. 351 U.S. at 250 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
93. 351 U.S. at 247.
94. That merely an income tax question was resolved by Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch.
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Secondly, and equally adverse to the employee, the Court held
that the amount of compensation received was to be measured on
the date of the option's exercise.
The stock option plan in LoBue was not statutory and would
not have met the section 130A requirements had section 130A
been available when the parties entered into the stock option
transaction. However, the Court addressed itself to section 130A
and its effect upon the nature of a stock option. The Court viewed
section 130A as a policy resolution 5 and therefore did not view
this section's treatment of the employee as an investor determi-
native in deciding that the basic purpose of any stock option,
statutory or non-statutory, was to compensate, irrespective of
how the employee was taxed on the benefit received.
EARNINGS AND PROFITS AND STOCK OPTIONS
The major LoBue implication, that the clothing of an em-
ployee stock option in statutory dress failed to conceal the com-
pensatory nature of all stock option plans, was crucial to the
Luckman court. The Luckman court analyzed the nature of stock
options and found the LoBue implication controlling. Because
stock options are compensatory and because compensation ex-
penses reduce earnings and profits, the Luckman court reasoned,
the compensation element of a statutory stock option reduces
earnings and profits. Also, in light of LoBue, the Luckman court
measured the compensation on the date of the option's exercise
and reduced earnings and profits by the option spread at exercise.
The court's characterization of the stock option as compensa-
tion expense demonstrated a willingness to examine the nature
of the transaction rather than to rely on a mechanical formula as
1, § 130A, 64 Stat. 942 (1950) is undoubtedly correct. In Luckman, the Seventh Circuit
agreed with the Tax Court and held:
Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 421] was intended to lay down rules relating to the
specific income tax treatmentof applicable transactions. As the Tax Court con-
cluded, [section 421] . . . "refer[s] only to the tax treatment of the options for
income tax computation purposes."
Luckman v. Commissioner, 418 F.2d 381, 386 (7th Cir. 1969).
95. There may be at least six dates at which to measure the loss to the corporation:
(a) date of the adoption of the option plan; (b) the date on which the option is granted;
(c) the date on which the optionee has performed any conditions precedent to the exercise
of the option; (d) the date on which the optionee may first exercise the option; (e) the
date of exercise; and (f) the dateon which the optionee disposes of the stock acquired. P.
GRADY, ACCOUNTING RESEARCH STUDY No. 7, INVENTORY OF GENERALLY ACCEPTED AccoUNT-
ING PRINCIPLES FOR BUSINESS ENTERPRISES 217 (1965). For purposes of this note only the




was done in Divine. Unfortunately, once attuned to the nature of
the transaction the court was unable to examine the mode of
payment in light of its effect on the corporation.
When exercised, all stock options create the appearance of a
loss to the corporation which may be measured at any one of
several points.96 One measuring point for this loss, applicable to
both non-statutory and restricted stock options granted at a price
below market value, is the date of grant. If the employee were to
exercise the option immediately, the corporation would receive
less capital than it would have received had it sold the shares on
the open market. By suffering a purchase at the option price, the
corporation has suffered an apparent loss measurable by the dif-
ference between the market value on the date .of grant and the
option price (the option spread at grant). An alternate measuring
point for the loss, applicable to all stock options, is the date of
the option's exercise. By suffering a purchase at the option price,
the corporation has suffered an apparent loss measurable by the
difference between the market value on the date of exercise and
the option price (the option spread at exercise). Regardless of the
measuring point selected, the loss to the corporation is not real-
ized in the sense that it is a cash payment," but is rather an
opportunity cost. The corporation has lost the opportunity to sell
the stock at a higher price. With a rising market, the opportunity
cost will be greatest for any stock option at the exercise date,"s so,
quite naturally, the taxpayers in Divine and Luckman contended
that the exercise date was the appropriate measuring point for the
corporation's loss on the stock options.
The Luckman court erred when it focused on the amount of
income to the employee rather than the income tax basis of the
assets to the corporation. When the court reduced earnings and
profits by the amount of the income to the employee it was in-
96. See Gardner-Denver Co. v. Commissioner, 75 F.2d 38 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
295 U.S. 763 (1935) where the taxpayer corporation had granted an option whose price at
grant equalled the stock's market value. The taxpayer claimed the option spread at
exercise as a compensation deduction and lost, the court stating:
[W]hen a specified price was paid, a subsequent increment in the value of the
stock cannot be regarded as . . . compensation. . . . And in no event would such
a subsequent advance in value represent loss or outlay or expense to the corporation
75 F.2d at 40.
97. This is true because the option will be exercised only in a rising market. Dean
Griswold has criticized the income tax treatment of a qualified stock option as a capital
contribution because the employee has risked no capital. Griswold, The Mysterious Stock
Option, 51 Ky. L. REv. 246 (1962).
98. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 312(a)(3). See note 47 supra and accompanying text.
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cluding in the reduction the amount of unrealized loss on the sale
of stock. Such an inclusion violates the realization requirement
because earnings and profits are being reduced while the corpo-
rate assets remain unchanged. This principle is demonstrated
when the corporation distributes appreciated property to a share-
holder. The corporation reduces earnings and profits by the ad-
justed basis of the property to the corporation"9 and not by the
amount of income to the shareholder. In its own unissued stock,
however, a corporation lacks a basis.""0 The corporation has not
expended any sum to acquire its own unissued stock and upon
issuing it has not realized or recognized any loss.' 0' In fact, even
if the corporation distributed treasury stock in which it had a
basis there would be no reduction of earnings and profits because
a capital stock transaction never results in a gain or loss,' 2 but
rather is an adjustment of the capital account.
As an alternative to the compensation argument, the
Luckman court maintained that in net effect the granting of a
stock option was the same as paying the employee in cash and
allowing him to purchase the stock. Because a cash payment
would reduce earnings and profits a stock option with the same
net effect should reduce earnings and profits.
This argument is subject to the initial criticism that it ig-
nores the form of the transaction; there would be no statutory
stock option if this form of payment were used.0 3 Also, taking this
net effect argument at face value, it assumes that a corporation
would commit itself to pay a cash sum dependent upon external
market factors'"4 that may bear little relation to the value of the
corporation. More fundamentally, the net effect argument ig-
nores the realization requirement of earnings and profits. With a
cash payment, an actual expense is subtracted from realized
gains. With a stock option, the appreciated value of the stock has
100. Jacoby, supra note 18, at 668.
101. See note 47 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the realization
requirement.
102. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1032.
103. This type of compensation, a cash payment, could not qualify as a stock option
under INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 422(b). The court drew this analogy from dictum in
Hudson Motor Car Co. v. United States, 3 F. Supp. 834 (Ct. Cl. 1933) which involved a
delivery of treasury stock to an employee with the intention to compensate him. Against
the contention of the Commissioner, the Court of Claims held that the taxpayer corpora-
tion was allowed a compensation deduction. Assuming that the Hudson analogy was once
valid, the validity it possessed ceased with the enactment of a statutory stock option.
104. This criticism was leveled in Jacoby, supra note 18 at 664.
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not been realized by the corporation as a loss.' Under the realiza-
tion requirement of earnings and profits, an unrealized loss does
not reduce earnings and profits.
The objection to a reduction of earnings and profits by the
option spread at exercise of a statutory stock option lies not only
in the absence of a realized loss, but in the harm such a reduction
would do to the separate entity theory. Under the separate entity
theory, if the shareholders of the corporation experience a loss the
corporation does not adjust its earnings and profits account to
reflect that loss. In the stock option transaction, the shareholders
of the corporation have suffered a dilution of their aggregate eq-
uity in the corporation' by the bargain purchase of the stock by
the employee.
If the employee exercises his option at a price that is less than
the book value of the shares he has become entitled to share in
the corporate assets without paying full value for the share he
receives. Consequently, his purchase results in the dilution of the
equity of the other shareholders. Of course, if the employee pur-
chases at a price which exceeds the book value there is no dilution
effect and the other shareholders are not injured. If there should
be a dilution effect the shareholders of the corporation and not
the corporation have compensated the employee.'07 Under the
separate entity theory of earnings and profits, their loss should
not be imputed to the corporation. Therefore, earnings and prof-
its should not be reduced by a statutory stock option transaction.
This theoretical conclusion, rejecting the reduction of earn-
ings and profits in a statutory stock option transaction, should be
reached with respect to the non-statutory stock option. In both
situations, the assets representing the realized gains upon the
corporation's capital have not been reduced.
Although neither of the Luckman court's two theories sup-
port the reduction of earnings and profits, a reduction of earnings
and profits might be supported on one of the exceptions to the
realization theory not advanced by the court. Realization, of
105. See Gardner-Denver Co. v. Commissioner, 75 F.2d 38 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
295 U.S. 763 (1935) (dictum); Griswold, The Mysterious Stock Option, 51 Ky. L. REV. 246
(1961); Jacoby, supra note 18, at 665; note 47 supra. Cf. Walker v. Hopkins, 12 F.2d 262
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 271 U.S. 687 (1926).
106. See Griswold, The Mysterious Stock Option, 51 Ky. L. REV. 246 (1961). Perhaps
this recognition of where the loss occurs underlies the requirement in INT. REV. CODE OF
1954, § 422(b) that the shareholders approve the option plan. Accounting practice also
requires financial statement disclosure of possible future dilution from the exercise of
unexercised but outstanding stock option. AICPA, APB OPINIoN No. 15 38-42 (1969).
107. See Griswold, The Mysterious Stock Option, 51 Ky. L. REV. 246 (1961).
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course, need not be present when there is a policy that would be
advanced by the reduction of earnings and profits. The line of
analysis that dealt with policy reasons'"8 for not reducing earnings
and profits for certain anti-social types of expenditures would not
mandate such a result for stock options. However, by analogy to
Code sections'019 which reduce earnings and profits by the amount
of a taxable stock dividend, a policy argument might be made to
reduce the earnings and profits of a corporation engaging in a
stock option transaction. The policy argument would be that in
a taxable stock dividend transaction the shareholder who elects
to receive shares in lieu of cash has increased his interest in the
corporation if other shareholders have elected to receive cash.
Since the Code reduces earnings and profits in that circumstance,
earnings and profits should also be reduced when an employee
increases his interest in the corporation by reason of exercising
a stock option. This analogy, however, remains unpersuasive for
statutory stock options for two reasons. First, the recipient of the
option is not taxed at the date of grant or at the date of exercise. ' 0
Therefore, the equitable argument of double taxation that pro-
vides some support for the earnings and profits treatment of taxa-
ble stock dividends provides little or no support for similar treat-
ment for statutory stock options."' Even if this objection were
assumed away, however, another objection to the analogy rests on
the purpose of section 312(d). This section appears concerned
with distributions to a shareholder in his capacity as a share-
holder." 2 With the statutory stock option, the distribution is
made to an employee in his capacity as an employee. Thus, the
thrust of section 312(d) would be directed to a new area if an
analogy from it to the statutory stock option transaction were
drawn.
As applied to the recipient of a non-statutory stock option,
the analogy from section 312(d) is somewhat more persuasive.
108. See note 59 supra and accompanying text.
108.1. See note 82 supra and accompanying text.
109. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 312(d), 305(b).
110. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 421(a)(1). However, qualified stock options are a tax
preference item [INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 57(a)(6)] and may be subject to tax under
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 56(a).
111. See note 67 supra and accompanying text.
112. Harold S. Divine, [1972 Transfer Binder] CCH TAx CT. REP. 3235, 3245 [CCH
Dec. 31,582], 59 T.C No. 15, n. 11. The reference in Treas. Reg. § 1.312-1(d) (1955) to
the tax imposed upon a shareholder under INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 305(b) supports this




Both the recipient of the non-statutory stock options and the
stock dividend may increase their interest in the corporation.
Once they do they have received value in the same way and are
not being taxed on an illusory increase.
However, for both statutory and non-statutory stock options,
the analogy is no stronger than the theoretical foundation for re-
ducing earnings and profits for a taxable stock dividend. As was
previously discussed, theoretical support for the earnings and
profits treatment of a taxable stock dividend is all but nonexis-
tent. Being such an aberration the theory should not be extended
to an area for which it was not intended.
CONCLUSION
Although neither the statutory nor the non-statutory stock
option involve the distribution of corporate assets, both courts
that have examined the stock option have concluded that at some
point in time a reduction of earnings and profits should occur.
Although the Divine and Luckman courts differed on the time
when a reduction was proper, the courts were not divided on what
they considered the theory of earnings and profits. However, in-
stead of theory, it was the mode of analyzing the stock option that
divided the courts. Divine failed to provide a satisfying analysis
by resting on the untenable proposition that the earnings and
profits treatment of a stock option follows its income tax treat-
ment. Luckman went so far as to examine the nature of the stock
option transaction, but fell into a mechnical mode of analysis
once it classified the payment as compensation. What neither
court attempted was a delineation of earnings and profits theory
and an application thereof to the stock option. If this were at-
tempted, the theoretical result appears to be no reduction of earn-
ings and profits by reason of either the statutory or non-statutory
stock option at any time.
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